Introduction
In cooperative game theory, given a set of players, players cooperate in order to optimize their payoffs. A transferable utility game (also called a cooperative game in characteristic function form with side payments) with player set N is a function that assigns a real number to each coalition.
Many different solution concepts have been established to determine how the payoffs should be distributed between the players in the case of cooperation. [3, 7, 8, 9, 11] are only a few examples of remarkable works in the literature. One solution concept that has received a great deal of attention in the literature and is widely accepted as the major stability notion in cooperative game theory is the core, which is defined by Gillies [5] . The core of a transferable utility game is the set of all feasible outcomes upon which no coalition can improve. Yet, the core of a game can be empty. Shapley and Bondareva [2, 10] give a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a transferable utility game to have a nonempty core via balanced collections, which is known as the Shapley-Bondareva theorem.
In this paper, we define a decomposition of transferable utility games based on shifting the worth of the grand coalition so that the associated game has a nonempty core. We classify the set of all transferable utility games according to this decomposition and analyze the structure of them. We give a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a transferable utility game to have a singleton core via balanced collections. We show that most of the transferable utility games have some specific structure, namely, most of them can be written as a sum of 2 games, one being the associated game that has a singleton core and the other being the remaining, trivial game.
Preliminaries
Given n ∈ N, let N := {1, . . . , n} denote the set of finite players. A transferable utility game (or simply a game), with player set N is a function v : 2 N → R such that v(∅) := 0 . For each T ⊆ N , we refer to v(T ) as the worth of coalition T . Let G denote the set of all games (with player set N ).
Nonempty subsets of the player set are called coalitions.
A vector x ∈ R N assigning payoff x i ∈ R to player i ∈ N is called a payoff vector. For a payoff vector
x ∈ R N and ∅ ̸ = S ⊆ N , the total payoff of the players in coalition S is x(S) := ∑ i∈S x i . A payoff vector x is feasible if x(N ) ≤ v(N ), and stable if for each ∅ ̸ = S ⊆ N ,
x(S) ≥ v(S).
The set of all feasible and stable payoff vectors is called the core of the game v , denoted by C(v); i.e.
C(v)
The set of all games with nonempty cores is denoted by G c , and the set of all games with empty cores is denoted
It is well known that the core satisfies the following property, which is known as covariant under strategic
For the property, see for example [9] .
A collection {S 1 , . . . , S k } of coalitions of N is balanced if there exists a collection of real numbers 
A decomposition of games
In this section, we give the definition of the decomposition of games, and classify the set of all games based on this decomposition.
Given a pair of games v,ṽ ∈ G , for each S ⊆ N , (v +ṽ)(S) := v(S) +ṽ(S) and
Given v ∈ G , for each r ∈ R, v r is defined as follows:
Let M v := {r ∈ R : C(v r ) ̸ = ∅} , and r * := min r∈Mv r .
We briefly discuss the existence of r * . It is well known that games with nonempty cores, that is G c , is characterized by the Shapley-Bondareva theorem: "For each v ∈ G , C(v) ̸ = ∅ if and only if for each minimal balanced collection {S 1 , . . . , S k } with balancing 
. By the Shapley-Bondareva theorem, one can easily check r * = min r∈Mv
. In other words, the value r * is a 'boundary value' with the property that for each r ≥ r * , the game v r has a nonempty core and for each r < r * , the game v r has an empty core.
We call the game v r * the minimal game associated with the game v . Note that for each game there is a unique minimal game associated with that game, but not vice versa.
Given v ∈ G , we define a new game w as follows: While it is a small class, G r allows us to understand the structure of G . For that, we classify G into groups with the help of the following classification of G r .
G r is divided into 2 disjoint groups depending on the size of their cores.
(i) G sin : The set of all root games each of which has a single vector in its core is denoted by G sin , that is,
(ii) G mul : The set of all root games each of which has more than one vector in its core is denoted by G mul , that is, Figure 1 shows the classification of G r . Now we classify the set of all games depending on their associated minimal games. First, G is divided into the two disjoint groups, G c and G c . Next, G c is divided into 2 disjoint groups depending on the size of cores of root games.
The set of all games with nonempty cores each of which has a singleton in the core of its root game
The set of all games with nonempty cores each of which has more than one element in the core of its root game is denoted by G m , that is,
Note also that if v ∈ G s , then there is a unique element, say x, such that C(v r * ) = {x} , and
Lastly, the set of all games with empty cores, that is G c , is divided into 2 disjoint groups depending on the size of cores of their associated minimal games.
The set of all games with empty cores each of which has a singleton in the core of its associated minimal game is denoted by G s , that is,
(ii) G m : The set of all games with empty cores each of which has more than one element in the core of its associated minimal game is denoted by G m , that is, A similar argument of partitioning the set of all games into equivalence is also used in [1] , where they use their partitioning to study the core of combined games. Figure 2 . Here, we are working with v r * , because geometrically, the change in the core is given by a hyperplane, while it will be given by a region bounded by a hyperplane otherwise.
Remark 2 Our classification of the set of all games is based on the core and the root game of a game. A similar argument can be used for other classifications of the set of all games by changing the worth of some
. . G . Gc . . Gm . v = v r * − w . | C ( v r * ) | > 1 . . Gs . v = vr * − w . | C ( vr * ) | = 1 . C ( v ) = ∅ . . Gc . . Gm . v = v r * + w . | C ( v r * ) | > 1 . . Gs . v = vr * + w . | C ( vr * ) | = 1 . C ( v ) ̸ = ∅ .v (r,T ) (S) := { v(S) if T ̸ = S ⊆ N, r if S = T. Let M (v,T ) := {r ∈ R : C(v (r,T ) ) ̸ = ∅} ,
Structure of games
In this section, we examine the class of all games defined in Section 3 in terms of minimal balanced collections. First, we give the geometric intuition behind our theorems.
Geometrically, it is not hard to see that nearly all the games in G c are in G s . Let a game that has a nonempty core be given. Roughly, if one shifts/changes the worth of the grand coalition as much as possible to obtain the root game of the given game, then the probability of ending up with a single point is higher than that of ending up with a line segment (or a hyperplane segment). In other words, the probability of getting a root game in G sin is higher than that of getting a root game in G mul .
As an example, consider N = {1, 2, 3} and the game v(12) = 1 , v(123) = 5 , and v(S) = 0 otherwise. In general, given v ∈ G c , let R be the region defined by the collection of the inequalities (x(S) ≥ v(S)) ∅̸ =S⊂N . For each r ∈ R, let P r denote the hyperplane x(N ) = r. Note that for each r ∈ R, the normal vector of P r is (1, . . . , 1) . Remember that C(v) = R ∩ P v(N ) . Moreover, in order to find the root game of v , one looks for the minimum value of r ∈ R such that R ∩ P r ̸ = ∅, which in fact is denoted by r * .
Note that v r * ∈ G mul if there is a line segment (or a hyperplane segment) on the boundary of R with the normal vector (1, . . . , 1), and v r * ∈ G sin otherwise. Geometrically, given v ∈ G c , the probability of having a line segment (or a hyperplane segment) on the boundary of R with the normal vector (1, . . . , 1) is nearly zero. Thus, probabilistic measure of the set G mul is zero. Therefore, nearly all of the games in G c are in G s . Similar geometric results hold for the set G c .
Our next results in this paper explain the above geometric reasonings more precisely by minimal balanced collections. They allow us to compare the cardinalities of the sets and understand the structure of games more precisely.
The first theorem concerns the games in G r . It is pretty straightforward to drive the next theorem by the (strong version of) Shapley-Bondarev theorem. Yet, it gives an obvious characterization of the games in G r , and helps us to consider the latter theorems given in this section. each minimal balanced collection {S 1 , . . . , S k } with balancing coefficients λ 1 , . . . , λ k , inequality 
Theorem 1 v ∈ G r if and only if the following conditions hold: (i) for
The proof of the theorem is easy and thus omitted.
Next, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the set of games each of which has a single element in it is core, i.e. for G sin . The result leads also to sufficient conditions for G mul . Using these results, we compare the cardinalities of the set of games given via decomposition.
We first analyze the special case |N | = 3.
For N = {1, 2, 3} , the minimal balanced collections that are different than {N } are {{1}, {2, 3}} , {{2}, {1, 3}} , {{3}, {1, 2}} , {{1}, {2}, {3}} and {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} .
Theorem 2 Let the player set be N = {1, 2, 3}. v ∈ G mul if and only if the inequality (2) of Theorem 1 is a strict inequality at the minimal balanced collections {{1}, {2}, {3}} and {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} , and it is an equality at only one of the minimal balanced collections below:
(i) {{1}, {2, 3}} , (ii) {{2}, {1, 3}} , (iii) {{3}, {1, 2}}.
Proof
We know G mul ⊂ G r ; thus by Theorem 1, to have v ∈ G mul , we only need to show that the inequality (2) of Theorem 1 is an equality at only one of the minimal balanced collections given in the theorem.
We consider the cases one by one.
Assume that the inequality (2) of Theorem 1 is an equality at {{1}, {2}, {3}} ; then v(1) + v(2) + v(3) = v(123). Then, for x ∈ C(v) , obviously, for each i ∈ N , x i = v(i).
Thus, v ∈ G sin . Therefore, to have v ∈ G mul , the inequality (2) of Theorem 1 cannot be an equality at {{1}, {2}, {3}}. Now, assume that the inequality (2) of Theorem 1 is an equality at {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}. Then
v(12) + v(13) + v(23) = 2v(123). For x ∈ C(v), we know
By adding them, we get 2v(1, 2, 3)
which has a unique solution, because the determinant of the 3 × 3 matrix on the left-hand side is nonzero. Therefore, to have v ∈ G mul , the inequality (2) of Theorem 1 cannot be an equality at {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}. Now, assume that the inequality (2) of Theorem 1 is an equality at any 2 of the balanced collections, {{1}, {2, 3}} , {{2}, {1, 3}} and {{3}, {1, 2}} . Without loss in generality, let the inequality (2) of Theorem 1 be an equality at {{1}, {2, 3}} and {{2}, {1, 3}}. Then
we have x 1 ≥ v(1) and x 2 + x 3 ≥ v(23), but by adding them up and using the previous equality, we get
, we have x 3 uniquely determined as well.
Thus, v ∈ G sin . Hence, the inequality (2) of Theorem 1 cannot be an equality at any 2 (or 3) of the balanced collections, {{1}, {2, 3}} , {{2}, {1, 3}} and {{3}, {1, 2}} . Thus, given v ∈ G r , to have a game v ∈ G mul , due to symmetry, the only possibilities are to have an equality at only one of the minimal balanced collections:
By the negation of this theorem combined with Theorem 1, we also get a characterization of G sin for N = {1, 2, 3} . given v ∈ G r , the probability of v being in G mul is 3/31 ≈ 0.1 and the probability of v being in G sin is 28/31 ≈ 0.9. Thus in fact, given v ∈ G c , the probability of v being in G s is approximately 0.9.
Before giving our general result for any |N | ≥ 3 , we first study the special case |N | = 4, which provides insight into the general case.
For N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the minimal balanced collections different than {N } up to symmetries are given by Table 1 . (2) This gives us the information that given v ∈ G c it is more likely to have v ∈ G s ; thus, by definition of the core, there is a unique payoff vector, say
In light of the case N = {1, 2, 3, 4} discussed above, we have the following general result.
Note that any subset of N is in
For each pair i, j ∈ N , define w ij ∈ G N as follows:
For each pair i, j ∈ N , letx ij : = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , 0, x i+1 , . . . , x j−1 , 0, x j+1 , . . . x n ) . For each S ⊆ N , v(S) = w ij (S) +x ij (S). Since core is a solution concept satisfying covariant under strategic equivalence property, * If x i + x j = 0 , then nothing will change in the proof. In fact, we take x i + x j ̸ = 0 just for clarity of the proof. 
, at which there is at least one coalition S ∈P ij such that i ∈ S , but j ̸ ∈ S , because otherwise |C(w ij )| ̸ = 1 . We claim thatP ij satisfies the condition given in the conclusion of the theorem. For that, we prove the following lemma. 
The above equality gives us the desired result of the lemma. 2
Finally, using the above lemma, for each pair i, j ∈ N ,P ij satisfies the necessary condition given in the theorem. 2
Theorem 3 provides a necessary condition for a singleton core in root games, but it is not a sufficient condition, as the next example shows.
First, we need some definitions. Let v ∈ G r be a game that satisfies the conclusion of Theorem 3. BC v will denote the set of all minimal balanced collections that satisfy the condition given in the conclusion of 
Note that
The example shows that the conclusion of Theorem 3 is not enough for a sufficient condition, yet it gives us the intuition for sufficiency. For a sufficient condition, let v ∈ G r satisfy the conclusion of Theorem 3. Let
Note that for each
Now, define
where A v is a m × n matrix, x t is the n × 1 matrix formed by writing x ∈ C(v) as a column matrix, and 
, at which there is at least one coalition S ∈ P ij such that i ∈ S , but j ̸ ∈ S and if A v x t = b v has a unique solution,
In light of Theorem 3, for G mul , we also have the following result.
Theorem 5 Let v ∈ G r . If the condition
• there is at least one pair i, j ∈ N , for each minimal balanced collection P = {S 1 , . . . , S k } with balancing coefficients λ 1 , . . . , λ k satisfying ∑ k l=1 λ l v(S l ) = v(N ), if i ∈ S ∈ P , then j ∈ S, holds, then v ∈ G mul .
The proof of the theorem is omitted, because the theorem is simply the contrapositive of Theorem 3 combined with the fact that G r = G sin ∪ G mul where G sin ∩ G mul ̸ = ∅ .
In light of Theorems 3 and 5, similar to the case in |N | = 4 , given v ∈ G c , the probability of v being in G s is approximately 1. Also note that, as |N | increases, this probability tends to 1 more rapidly. Thus, nearly all games that are in G c are in G s , and thus they have the structure v = v r * + w , where v r * ∈ G sin and w ∈ G z . Similar results hold for the set of games in G c , i.e. nearly all games that are in G c are in G s , and thus they have the structure v = v r * − w , where v r * ∈ G sin and w ∈ G z . Lastly, we discuss the importance of our results for core selective allocation rules. An allocation rule for transferable utility games is a function that assigns a payoff vector to each game in G . An allocation rule is core selective if it assigns an element from C(v) when v ∈ G c . Many core selective allocation rules have been constructed to determine which core element should be chosen whenever the core is nonempty. Given v = v r * + w ∈ G c , by our findings, we see that with a high probability v is in G s . In that case, there exists a unique payoff vector, {x} = C(v r * ), which is a common element for any core selective allocation rule whenever the allocation rule is additive † . Thus, when we restrict ourselves to the games in G s , additive core selective allocation rules will differ only at the selection of a payoff vector from C(w). Let Γ be an additive core selective allocation rule that is also egalitarian on w , i.e. Γ(w) = w(N ) |N | . Then Γ corresponds to the well-known allocation rule, the per-capita nucleolus defined by Grotte [6] , when we restrict ourselves to G s . In general, our results in this paper also give information about these allocation rules. A more extensive study about the relations between our results and allocation rules is part of an ongoing project.
